The Toronto market fell on Wednesday, October 7, 2026, and the miners led it. By 10:08 a.m. Eastern the S&P/TSX Composite was down 1.33 percent, at 35,174. The materials group, which holds the precious-metals names, was down 2.7 percent and at a two-month low. Gold was down. Silver was down harder. One midday report said silver had fallen more than 5 percent. Later spot quotes put the ounce near $60, after a prior-day area around $61.40, with an intraday low near $59. One print that afternoon was $59.86. The screens did not agree on the hour. They agreed on the direction.
Here is the only idea that makes a list of five honest. Silver is not crashing today. It already fell from a January 29 spot high of $121.62 an ounce, with March futures touching $121.785 the same morning, to about $60. That is a drop of about half. A $59.86 print was 50.8 percent under $121.62. Today is a rates day inside that larger drop. The TSX is falling because yields are at highs not seen since 2002, oil is above $100, and the market is pricing another hike. Canadian silver mining companies fall on that day because their shares are a geared claim on the silver price. Watching five of them means knowing which machine you are watching. A producer whose cheap silver cost is a gold credit. A Mexico miner whose sustaining cost sits near $28, not near $16. A Moroccan mine next to a study priced in U.S. dollars. A company whose blockade already ended, and whose mill repair was still on the calendar. And a streamer that owns no mine. Best silver stocks is the wrong phrase. Different machines is the right one.
Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, any fund, or the metal. Costs and guidance are what the companies have said, or what a named report attributed to them. A past quarter is not the next one. A by-product cost and a silver-equivalent cost are not the same ruler.
What the TSX is actually doing
The index is not collapsing. It is giving back a rally. On Tuesday it had closed at 35,650, its highest close in more than a week. On Wednesday morning it was back near 35,174, the lowest since October 1. Financials fell about 1.7 percent. Royal Bank and TD were each down more than 1.7 percent. Materials fell more. A portfolio manager, Matthew Kempton at Verecan, told Reuters that bond yields have been the big driver of the Canadian market of late. When rates rise, bank margins and the appetite for miners can worsen together. The U.S. 10-year yield was reported near 5.32 percent. The 30-year was near 5.70 percent. Both were the highest since 2002. Traders, in LSEG data cited that morning, saw an 86 percent chance of a Federal Reserve hike in December, and at least one quarter-point hike from the Bank of Canada by year-end. Brent was up about 1.1 percent, near $101.68.
That is the tape the silver stocks walked into. Pan American Silver was down about 2.8 percent in one midday tally. Wheaton Precious Metals was down about 2.8 percent, at $133.67. The streamer did not get a free pass. Barrick, Kinross, and Franco-Nevada were down in the same range. First Quantum was down more, but it is not a silver story. The point is narrower. A bad day for the silver price became a bad morning for every way Canadians own silver exposure. The structure of the company changed the size of the move by tenths, not by kind. Those share moves are morning prints. They are not the closing tape.
Is silver price expected to crash
Is silver price expected to crash? Split the word. From the January 29 spot high of $121.62 to a price near $60, silver has already dropped about 51 percent. Kitco, writing in March, put that spot high at $121.62. The same morning, March Comex futures touched $121.785. A dealer site later printed $121.67. The cents differ. The drop does not. About half the peak is gone. That is the crash, if you measure from the peak. It happened over months, not in a morning. From a year ago, when the ounce was near $48, silver is still up about 25 percent. From six months ago, when it was near $72, it is down about 17 percent. From a month ago, near $66, it is down about 10 percent. Same metal. Four answers. Anyone who says silver is crashing without saying from which price is selling a mood.
A further crash, from $60, would be a new event. It is possible. Silver pays no interest. The yields that knocked gold this week knock silver too, and silver's swings are larger. It is not required. A price that has already been cut in half from a mania high can fall more, and it can also stop, without either path being a forecast you can bank. The silver price forecast that is useful this week is not a target. It is a description. The ounce is still well above the old world, still far below January, and still moving with real rates. The silver price outlook for a Canadian miner is that description plus the company's own ounces and costs.
Industrial demand does not cancel the drop. Solar, cars, and electronics still use silver. Most mine supply still comes as a by-product of other metals, so a high price does not quickly create new primary mines. Those facts were true at $121 and they are true at $60. They explain why the metal ran. They do not explain why it gave half of the run back. The giveback was the unwind of a crowded trade, plus a higher real rate, plus a metal that traded like a risk asset when the war stressed markets. Robin Brooks, writing on June 26, measured silver's boom and bust against a Jackson Hole speech. Up about 200 percent at the January peak, then up only about 52 percent when he wrote. The shape matches a bubble that corrected, not a commodity that ran out of ore.
Pan American: the cheap cost that gold is paying for
Pan American Silver is the large Canadian name in the group, and its guidance is easy to misread. For 2026 it has guided attributable silver production of 25 million to 27 million ounces, up from 22.84 million in 2025. Attributable gold is 700,000 to 750,000 ounces. The silver-segment all-in sustaining cost is guided at $15.75 to $18.25 an ounce. Set next to a $60 silver price, that range looks like a machine that prints money. Read the line under it. The gold segment is guided at $1,700 to $1,850 an ounce of gold. The silver-segment cost is low because gold and other credits are doing a large part of the paying. Cerro Moro, in the company's own table, is guided at a negative silver-segment cost, from $(25.75) to $(21.75). A negative cost is not a mine that runs for free. It is a mine where the gold by-product math has overwhelmed the silver line.
The company also said the silver-segment cost would be $1.87 to $4.37 higher than 2025's $13.88, excluding a net-realizable-value inventory adjustment, because higher metal-price assumptions raise royalties, worker participation, and smelting charges. That is the fact to watch. When silver and gold are high, the stated cost rises with them. When they fall, some of that cost pressure eases, and the share price falls anyway because the revenue falls faster. The first half of 2026 already printed a silver-segment cost of $12.64, under the full-year range. The guide steps up later in the year. A cheap half is not a cheap year until the second half is in.
Pan American is not a pure silver stock. A large share of the value is gold, from Jacobina, El Peñon, Timmins, Shahuindo, and the rest of the gold segment. On a day when both metals drop, you are watching two tapes in one ticker. The 2.8 percent decline on Wednesday morning was the blend, not a verdict on La Colorada. The test is whether the 25 to 27 million ounces arrive, and at a cost that still makes sense if silver is $60 rather than the higher price baked into royalty assumptions. Juanicipio, at the 44 percent interest in the guidance table, and higher-grade underground ore at Cerro Moro are the sources of the growth the company named. If those ounces slip, the low cost guide does not save the quarter. A low all-in cost on ounces you did not produce is a spreadsheet.
First Majestic: the cost that is not $16
First Majestic Silver updated its 2026 guidance on July 8. The range is 14.6 million to 15.5 million ounces of silver, up from an original 13.0 million to 14.4 million, and 128,000 to 135,000 ounces of gold, up from 116,000 to 129,000. The operating mines in that update sit in Mexico, including a 70 percent interest in Los Gatos. That is a real production book. It is also a concentration. Political, labor, permitting, and security risks in one country sit on the whole equity. Pan American can have a bad week in Mexico and still have Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Canada. First Majestic does not have that spread. In a silver bull market, concentration is how you get more torque. In a drawdown, concentration is how one headline hits every ounce you own.
The cost is the part a casual read skips, and it is in the same filing. Cash cost is guided at $19.27 to $19.85 per payable silver-equivalent ounce. All-in sustaining cost is guided at $27.69 to $28.77 per silver-equivalent ounce, about 4 percent higher at the midpoint than the prior guide. The company tied that increase to higher silver prices and a stronger Mexican peso. Read the unit. This is not a by-product cost per ounce of silver, the way Pan American's $15.75 to $18.25 is. It is a cost per silver-equivalent ounce. Gold, and the lead, zinc, and copper in the same guide, are inside the equivalence. You cannot line $28 up against $16 and declare a winner. You can say this: at a $60 silver price, a sustaining cost near $28 still leaves a cushion, and it is a much thinner cushion than the by-product figure that gets quoted for the large diversified name.
The midpoint of that sustaining-cost range is about $28.23. Against $60, the crude spread is about $32 per silver-equivalent ounce. Against $50, it is about $22. Neither subtraction is profit. Both are a reason not to describe First Majestic as a mine that "prints" the way a $16 by-product cost suggests. The shares should still move more than the silver price, in both directions. They are a silver investment with operating risk and a published cost, not a coin. Wednesday's group move, with producers down a few percent on a day silver was down several, is the mild version. Mild days are not the design of the stock.
The watch item is the second half, and the unit. The company has framed the ounce range as the result of throughput and grade at mines it raised after a strong first half. A guide that is a range is an admission that the year is not locked. Watching means waiting for quarterly silver-equivalent costs near that $28 band, not for a slogan about Mexican silver.
Aya: a mine that works, and a study priced in dollars
Aya Gold and Silver is the name that splits in two. Zgounder, in Morocco, is a mine. In the second quarter it produced about 1.49 million ounces of silver, inside about 1.68 million ounces of silver equivalent, a record quarter. The plant ran at 3,889 tonnes a day. Recovery was 91.2 percent. One detailed account put Zgounder's second-quarter cash cost near US$17.69 an ounce. That is a filing-style figure from a secondary write-up, and it is the number to prefer over a later interview. In early October the chief executive, Benoit La Salle, was reported describing cash costs around $16, sustaining costs around $19, and a large annual cash-flow figure. The same interview account also cited about C$170 million a year after expenses. Round numbers that do not match each other inside one conversation are not guidance. Use the quarterly cash cost. Treat the interview as color.
The 2026 production range needs the same care. A July production note described guidance of 6.2 million to 6.8 million ounces of silver. A later detailed account described 6.2 million to 6.8 million silver-equivalent ounces, with Zgounder itself at 5.2 million to 5.8 million ounces of silver and a cash-cost guide near US$21.50. Those are not the same sentence. Until you are reading the company's own guidance table, do not pick the more flattering unit. The direction is still clear. Zgounder is producing, the plant is above a casual "near 4,000 tonnes" shrug, and the cost that has been reported for the quarter sits in the high teens, not in the high twenties.
Boumadine is the other half, and it is not a mine yet. The September 9 preliminary economic assessment put the after-tax net present value near $3.5 billion and the internal rate of return at 93 percent, using $3,500 gold and $50 silver. Initial capital in that table is $463 million. The metal prices in the same table are in U.S. dollars, and a later account labels the capital figure as U.S. dollars. A paraphrase that called it about C$450 million mixed the currency. Use US$463 million. A study that works at $50 silver is not broken by a spot price near $60. It is also not cash. The chief executive has talked about early infrastructure and a feasibility study in the second half of 2027. Those are plans sitting next to a model. They are not a plant.
Aya is worth watching because the market will mix the two stories into one share price on a down day. Zgounder can be fine and the stock can still fall if investors mark down a US$463 million build in a weaker silver tape. Boumadine can be a good rock and still be the wrong use of cash if the study was sold at the romance of a much higher silver price than the $50 in the deck. Separate the mine that produces from the mine that is a study. If you cannot, you are not watching Aya. You are watching a ticker.
Endeavour: a blockade that ended, and a mill on a timer
Endeavour Silver is the warning against a stale headline. The company has spent years pointing at Terronera, in Jalisco, as the mine that changes its scale. In the second quarter Terronera processed 175,729 tonnes and produced 582,043 payable ounces of silver. Cash cost was $5.07 an ounce, the low number in the portfolio. Secondary accounts say gold credits sit in that math. The company's own line is a cash cost per ounce, not a slogan about equivalence. Consolidated silver production was about 1.94 million ounces. The company sold about 2.05 million ounces at an average of $70.16. Revenue was about $212 million. Those are real ounces. The $70.16 is the average of last quarter, not the price of the latest sale, and not the $60 tape of this week.
Then a blockade started, and then it ended. Members of a nearby ejido halted Terronera on August 12. On August 20 the mine was still suspended. On August 23 the company said the blockade had been lifted. Full operations were set to resume on August 24. The stoppage lasted about two weeks. It is a fact about community risk. It is not a fact that the flagship was still shut on October 7. Writing it as an open question, a month and a half later, is how a true story becomes a false one.
The live operating item was different, and it was a mill. On September 21 the company shut the primary ball mill at Guanaceví to replace the mill head and trunnion. The announcement came the next day. Repairs were expected to take about three weeks. During that work the regrind circuit would run about 600 tonnes a day against a normal rate near 1,100. Three weeks from September 21 points at about October 12. On October 7 that repair was not yet a finished public fact. Check the latest release before you treat Guanaceví as either fully down or fully back. And do not let one Mexican mill stand in for the company. A later account said Kolpa, in Peru, produced more silver than Terronera in the second quarter. Endeavour is not a single pit.
The killing fact is narrower than a shutdown story. Leverage to silver requires silver coming out of the mill. A two-week blockade that ended in August is a scar, not a current zero. A ball mill with a three-week clock is a current question. The metal's drop from a $70 realized quarter to a $60 spot price is a third question, and it applies even if every mill is running. On a day when the TSX materials group falls 2.7 percent because the metal fell, Endeavour can fall for that reason and for its own. Do not blend a finished blockade into the blend.
Wheaton: the stream that fell anyway
Wheaton Precious Metals is the fifth name because it is not a miner, and the day did not care. It is a Canadian streaming company. It pays a fixed, low price for a share of other companies' silver and gold, and it does not run the pits. In theory that makes it sturdier than a single mine in Mexico or Morocco. On Wednesday morning the theory took a 2.8 percent hit, to about $133.67, in line with Pan American. Franco-Nevada, the large royalty name, was down about 2.4 percent. The "safer" precious-metals equities were not a shelter from a metals rout. They were a slightly different door into the same room.
That is useful. If your silver investment was chosen to avoid mine risk, Wednesday showed the limit of the choice. You avoided a blockade, including one that had already ended. You did not avoid the silver price. A stream is still a claim on ounces times price, minus a small delivery payment. When the price drops hard in a morning, the stream's revenue drops with it. The multiple can drop too, because the market pays up for streams when the metal is rising and pays down when it is not. Wheaton does not have an all-in sustaining cost in the miner's sense. It has a contract. The contract does not set the share price. The metal does, most days.
Watch Wheaton if you want to see whether the selloff is about silver or about a mine. If Wheaton, Pan American, and a royalty name fall together, the day is the metal and the yields. If a producer falls much more, look for a company fact. Wednesday, on the numbers above, looked like the first kind. The morning did not know about Guanaceví's calendar. It knew about the ounce.
Is it good to invest in silver stocks now
Is it good to invest in silver stocks now? Not because the TSX is down, and not because silver is down on a Wednesday. A down day is not a discount you have calculated. It is a price. Silver near $60 is about half of $121.62 and about 25 percent above last year. Both are true. A stock can be far below its January high and still be expensive against $60 silver if the January high was a mania and the costs, the build, or a mill have changed.
It can be a reasonable study if you can answer four questions without a slogan. Which machine is it: diversified producer, concentrated producer, producer-plus-study, producer with a live mill repair, or stream? What silver price is already in the last realized sale, the royalty formula, and the economic study? Pan American's stated costs rise with the metal price. Aya's Boumadine study used $50. Endeavour's last reported quarter sold silver at $70.16. Those are three different embedded prices. What would stop the ounces: a grade miss, a permit, a mill, a currency in the wrong unit? And can you hold a move larger than the metal's, in both directions, without calling it a surprise?
If the answer is that you want silver and you do not want a mine, a stream or the metal itself is the cleaner exposure, and Wednesday showed the stream still falls. If the answer is that you want more than the metal, you are choosing Pan American's blend, First Majestic's $28 silver-equivalent cost, Aya's study, or Endeavour's mill clock. None of those is "best." Each is a different way to be wrong. Silver mining stocks are a good investment only in the narrow sense that the cushion over cost is real at the silver price you are willing to live with, the unit of that cost is the unit you think it is, and the ounces are actually being produced. They are a bad investment when the reason is that five Canadian names fit a headline on a red morning.
Primary silver and by-product silver are not the same bet
Most of the world's silver does not come from a silver mine. It comes out of a copper mine, a lead mine, a zinc mine, or a gold mine, as a passenger. That is why a high silver price does not quickly bring on a wave of new supply. The operator is digging for the other metal. Silver is the invoice that shows up later. A Canadian stock can sit on either side of that fact, and the side matters more in a drawdown than the logo does.
Pan American's silver segment looks cheap because gold is the other invoice. Its gold segment is a gold business that happens to produce some silver. First Majestic reports a cost per silver-equivalent ounce near $28, with gold and base metals in the equivalence, from mines in one country. Aya's Zgounder is a silver mine, with a reported quarterly cash cost in the high teens. Boumadine, if it is built, is a precious-metals project whose study used both gold and silver. Endeavour sells both, and its $5.07 cash cost at Terronera is a per-ounce figure that secondary accounts say includes gold credits. Wheaton streams both metals from other people's pits. Calling all five "silver stocks" is fair for a headline and sloppy for a position. On a day when silver falls 5 percent and gold falls 2 percent, the purer silver name should hurt more. On a day when gold falls harder, the blend should hurt more. Wednesday was a both-metals day, which is why the stocks fell together and the differences looked small.
The by-product structure also explains a trap in the silver price forecast. If you need new primary mines to close a deficit, you are waiting on companies like Aya to build, and on mills like Guanaceví to turn, not on a copper miner to suddenly care more about silver. Those builds and repairs are slow, political, and easy to halt. A deficit can be real and the price can still fall, because the price is set by the marginal buyer of bars and futures, not by the five-year gap in a spreadsheet. The deficit is a reason the ounce got to about $121.60. It is not a promise it stays above $60.
A ten-dollar move, as arithmetic only
Do the next $10 as subtraction, not as a prediction. Silver near $60 minus $10 is $50. That happens to be the silver price in Aya's Boumadine study. A move to $50 would not break that study's deck. It would erase the cushion between the deck and the spot price that made the study look conservative. Zgounder's cushion, if the second-quarter cash cost near US$17.69 holds, would shrink from about $42 an ounce to about $32. Still wide. Cash cost is not all-in sustaining cost. The cushion is smaller once sustaining capital is in the line, and this article is not inventing that all-in figure.
Pan American's silver-segment guide of $15.75 to $18.25 would still sit far under $50. The gold credit would be doing less work if gold fell in tandem, and the royalty relief from a lower price would give some cost back. The share would not care about that subtlety on the day. First Majestic's sustaining-cost midpoint near $28.23 would leave about $22 per silver-equivalent ounce at a $50 silver price, against about $32 at $60. That is still a business. It is not the business a reader imagines if they borrowed Pan American's by-product cost and pasted it onto this ticker.
Endeavour's last reported realized price was $70.16. A $50 spot price would be about $20 under that quarter. A $60 spot price is already about $10 under it. That gap is a revenue problem even if every mill is running, and a worse problem at Guanaceví if the regrind circuit is still the mill. Wheaton would deliver silver into its contracts at a lower spot price and pay the same low contract price to the miner. Its margin per ounce would shrink. Its share price, on the evidence of Wednesday, would not wait for the quarterly statement to show it.
None of these subtractions is a silver price outlook. They are a way to see that $60 is not a floor the companies promised. The floor, if there is one, is the cost of the primary mines plus the patience of the people who bought the mania. A cash cost near $18, or a silver-equivalent sustaining cost near $28, does not stop a price at $60. It tells you the mine can live lower. The share can live lower too. That is the risk of watching a stock instead of an ounce.
There is a calendar reason not to treat Wednesday as the whole story. Endeavour has often put out a third-quarter production update in early October. That note, when it exists, is the place to learn whether Guanaceví's mill was back, and what the two-week Terronera stoppage cost. It is not the place to rediscover a blockade that ended on August 24. Pan American and First Majestic will be judged on whether the annual ranges are still the ranges, and on whether First Majestic's silver-equivalent cost is still near $28. Aya will be judged on Zgounder's run rate and on which unit the 6.2 to 6.8 million figure actually is, not on Boumadine's model. Wheaton will be judged on ounces delivered, which you will not see in a morning index print. A red TSX morning is a price. A production release is a fact. Watch the fact.
How the five fail differently
Write the failure in advance, so the next red day does not feel like news.
Pan American fails the watch if the 25 to 27 million ounces slip, or if the gold segment's $1,700 to $1,850 cost climbs while gold is falling, so the credit that makes silver look cheap shrinks. It does not fail just because the share drops 3 percent on a metals morning. It also does not pass just because the first half printed $12.64. The full-year range is higher, and the later quarters are guided higher still.
First Majestic fails the watch if the 14.6 to 15.5 million ounce range is missed, or if the silver-equivalent sustaining cost breaks above $27.69 to $28.77 for reasons that are not a one-time peso move. It does not fail because it moves more than silver. That is what it is for. It fails a different test if a reader compares its $28 with Pan American's $16 and thinks they measured the same thing.
Aya fails the watch if Zgounder's ounces come in light, or if the quarterly cash cost near US$17.69 was a quarter and not a habit. It also fails, in a different way, if Boumadine's US$463 million starts to be spent as if a preliminary study were a feasibility. A net present value at $50 silver is a model. A cheque is cash. Quoting the cheque in Canadian dollars, when the study's table is in U.S. dollars, is a third failure, and it is a reader's failure.
Endeavour fails the watch if Guanaceví's mill repair becomes the quarter, or if the August stoppage at Terronera shows up as lost ounces the company has not yet put in a number. It does not fail because a headline from August 20 is still open. That headline closed on August 24. It does not fail because the second-quarter cash cost was $5.07. That cost was one mine, one quarter, with gold in the background of the math.
Wheaton fails the watch if you bought it as a place to hide from silver's volatility. It is not that place. It fails a different watch if the mines it streams from stop delivering, which is a credit list, not a price. Wednesday did not show that second failure. It showed the first.
The close
Silver stocks are under pressure because the TSX is under pressure, and the TSX is under pressure because yields and oil have markets pricing more hikes. Silver near $60 is not the start of the story. The start was a January 29 spot high of $121.62, with futures a few cents higher the same morning. About half of that peak is gone. The metal is still up about a quarter from a year ago. Canadian silver mining companies are how that path becomes a share price, with extra moving parts.
The five to watch are five parts, not five picks. Pan American's low silver cost is a gold credit, and the company told you the cost is $1.87 to $4.37 higher than last year because the metals were assumed higher. First Majestic is a Mexican silver book with a published sustaining cost near $28 per silver-equivalent ounce, not a blank where the cost should be. Aya has a Moroccan mine that is producing and a second project that is still a study with US$463 million of initial capital in the model. Endeavour's flagship blockade ended on August 24. The open item was a Guanaceví mill with a three-week clock, and a last reported silver sale near $70, not a mine that is still shut. Wheaton owns no shovel and still fell with the miners.
Is it good to invest in silver stocks now? Only if you can name the machine, the unit of the cost, and the silver price you are underwriting. Is the silver price expected to crash? The crash from the high has already been booked. A crash from here is a guess. The TSX will not settle it. The ounces and the yields will.
A note on sources and limits
The TSX figures are from Reuters on October 7, 2026. The composite was down 1.33 percent at 35,174.22 as of 10:08 a.m. Eastern. Materials were down 2.7 percent. Brent was up about 1.1 percent near $101.68. The U.S. 10-year and 30-year yields were reported near 5.32 percent and 5.70 percent, the highest since 2002. LSEG-based odds cited that morning were about 86 percent for a December Fed hike, and at least one Bank of Canada hike by year-end. Kempton's comments are from that Reuters story. Tuesday's TSX close near 35,650 is from market commentary the next morning.
Kitco, in a March 20, 2026 article, put the January 29 spot high at $121.62. Kitco's January 29 futures report put the March Comex intraday high at $121.785. A later dealer-site figure of $121.67 is a few cents off the Kitco spot print and is not the figure used here. Spot near $60 on October 7, a $59.86 print that was 50.8 percent under $121.62, a prior-day area near $61.40, a one-year level near $48, a six-month level near $72, and a one-month level near $66 are from public spot and performance tables that day. A separate report said silver fell more than 5 percent during the morning rout. Use the timestamp. Brooks's 200 percent and 52 percent silver measures are his, from a June 26, 2026 note, against Chair Powell's August 22, 2025 Jackson Hole speech.
Share moves for Pan American, Wheaton, Franco-Nevada, and others are from a midday October 7 market report and will have changed by the close. Pan American's 2026 ranges are from the company's guidance: 25 to 27 million ounces of silver, against 22.84 million in 2025; 700,000 to 750,000 ounces of gold; silver-segment all-in sustaining cost of $15.75 to $18.25; gold-segment cost of $1,700 to $1,850. The increase of $1.87 to $4.37 versus 2025's $13.88, excluding the inventory adjustment, is the company's explanation, tied to royalties, worker participation, and smelting. Cerro Moro's guided silver-segment cost of $(25.75) to $(21.75) is from the same table. First-half silver-segment cost of $12.64 is from subsequent coverage of the company's results. Juanicipio is the 44 percent interest shown in the guidance table.
First Majestic's July 8, 2026 update, as filed, raised silver guidance to 14.6 million to 15.5 million ounces from 13.0 million to 14.4 million, and gold guidance to 128,000 to 135,000 ounces from 116,000 to 129,000. Cash cost is $19.27 to $19.85 per payable silver-equivalent ounce. All-in sustaining cost is $27.69 to $28.77 per silver-equivalent ounce. The company linked the cost increase to the silver price and the peso. Operating mines in that update are in Mexico, including Los Gatos at 70 percent. The midpoint near $28.23 and the spreads against $60 and $50 are arithmetic, not the company's forecast.
Aya's second-quarter figures of about 1.49 million ounces of silver, about 1.68 million silver-equivalent ounces, 3,889 tonnes a day, and 91.2 percent recovery are from the company's July 2026 production report as carried by Mining.com.au, which also described 2026 guidance as 6.2 million to 6.8 million ounces of silver. A later account described that range as silver-equivalent ounces, with Zgounder at 5.2 million to 5.8 million ounces of silver, a cash-cost guide near US$21.50, and a second-quarter Zgounder cash cost near US$17.69. The conflict is noted in the text and is not resolved here by choosing a favorite. The Boumadine study figures, including initial capital of $463 million, a net present value near $3.5 billion, a 93 percent internal rate of return, and decks of $50 silver and $3,500 gold, are from the company's September 9, 2026 assessment. The capital figure is treated as U.S. dollars because that is the unit of the metal prices in the same table. Interview remarks about costs, cash flow, infrastructure, and a 2027 feasibility are the chief executive's, as paraphrased, and they conflict with each other on the cash-flow line. They are not used as guidance.
Endeavour's second-quarter tonnes, 582,043 payable ounces, and $5.07 cash cost are from the company as reported by The Northern Miner and later outlets. Sales near 2.05 million ounces at $70.16, revenue near $212 million, and consolidated production near 1.94 million ounces are from coverage of that quarter. The blockade dates, August 12 through a resumption on August 24, are from the company as reported by BNamericas and Mexico Business News. The August 20 Northern Miner story was accurate that day and stale after August 24. The Guanaceví mill shutdown on September 21, the three-week repair, and the 600-versus-1,100 tonne rates are from the company's September 22 statement as reported afterward. Whether the mill was back on October 7 is not settled in those reports. The remark that Kolpa produced more silver than Terronera in the quarter is from a later secondary account, not from a table reproduced here.
Subtractions at $60 and $50 assume the cited cost does not change. Costs will change. This is not investment advice, not an offer, and not a solicitation to buy or sell any security or commodity. Silver and silver mining stocks can fall further. Mills can stay down. Studies can stay studies. Readers should read the filings, check the live silver price, and speak with a licensed adviser before any decision.