SSR Mining did not buy a mine on October 13, 2026. It signed a paper to buy the company that owns the ground next door. The cash price is C$6.75 a share. SSR put the fully diluted equity value of that cash, before a new paper stub, at about US$464 million. The enterprise value in the same sentence was about US$392 million. First gold from the project, on SSR's own case, is targeted for 2033. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell either stock, the stub, or the gold.
Here is the idea, and it is the only one. A deal is a price for a share. It is not a reserve, and it is not a permit. Gold mining mergers and acquisitions get told as if the cheque and the ounces were the same object. They are not. The cheque can close this quarter. The ounces, on the buyer's own page, are a concept that still includes inferred resources and a federal permit that has not been finished. What the SSR Mining acquisition means for investors is the gap between those two clocks. If you price the gap as if it had already closed, you have bought a headline.
What was signed, and what was not
SSR Mining news on October 13 was two releases, not one. SSR Mining, listed in Toronto and on Nasdaq under SSRM, agreed that a wholly owned affiliate will acquire every Roxmore share. Roxmore trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange as RM, and on the OTCQX as GARLF. The path is a court-approved plan of arrangement under British Columbia law. An agreement is not a closing. Closing is aimed at the fourth quarter of 2026, if the votes, the court, and the other conditions are met.
The cash is the clean half. Each Roxmore share is to be exchanged for C$6.75. SSR said that cash, excluding the stub, was about a 27 percent premium to Roxmore's Toronto close on October 9, and about a 47 percent premium to the 20-day volume-weighted average price. SSR said it will pay the cash from the current balance sheet. It called the deal highly accretive. That adjective is theirs. An adjective in a release is not a spreadsheet you can audit from the release alone. You can audit the C$6.75. You can audit the conditions. You cannot audit "accretive" until you know accretive to what, and in which year.
The stub is the other half, and it is not cash. Roxmore shareholders are also to receive shares in a new explorer. Roxmore's release put that at 0.33 of a SpinCo share for each Roxmore share, and put an estimated value on it of about C$0.50. On Roxmore's addition, the package is about C$663 million in cash plus about C$49 million of paper, or about C$712 million fully diluted. SSR's US$464 million figure is the cash equity value with the stub left out. Do not add the two companies' headlines together and call it a third price. They are the same deal in two currencies, with the stub counted on one page and set aside on the other.
SpinCo is a real object, and it is not Converse. It is to hold Rattlesnake Hills, the Newton property, and Shabu River. It is to be funded with US$10 million in cash. Former Roxmore holders are to own 85.01 percent. SSR is to own 14.99 percent. John Dorward, Roxmore's chief executive and executive chairman, is to lead it, with other members of the current team. The exploration that is not next to the mine stays with the sellers, in a new company, with a small cash box. SSR keeps a slice of that box's future. It does not keep the obligation to fund those projects the way a 100 percent owner would. Gold exploration companies are what that stub is. Gold exploration projects are what it holds. A C$0.50 estimate on paper that does not trade yet is a model of a market, not a bid.
The premium is a ratio. The tape is a vote.
How mining acquisitions affect stock prices is the second question people ask, and the morning already answered a version of it. The Northern Miner reported Roxmore up 30 percent to $6.96, a 52-week high on that account, and a market value of about $502 million. The same account reported SSR Mining stock down about 7 percent to $46.72 in Toronto, against a 12-month range of $25.83 to $54.50, and a market value near $9.4 billion. Those are one paper's morning prints. They are not a closing auction, and they are not a verdict on the rocks.
Read the seller first. If the $6.96 print is in Canadian dollars, it sat about 21 cents above the C$6.75 cash. Roxmore had told holders the stub was worth about 50 cents. A tape at 21 cents above the cash is the market marking the stub, the wait, and the chance the deal dies, all in one number. It is not proof the stub is worth 21 cents. It is proof that, for that hour, holders would not sell the package at the cash alone, and would not pay the company's 50-cent story in full. Canadian mining stocks do this often. The target jumps toward the bid. It rarely jumps to a perfect sum of cash plus a private estimate of paper.
Read the buyer second. SSR is the one writing the cheque. A lower share price on the announcement day is the market charging the buyer for cash that leaves, for a project that does not pour gold this year, and for a capital bill the buyer itself put at US$800 million to US$900 million. The Northern Miner offered the April study's US$829 million pre-production bill as one possible reason for the drop. That is a guess about a price. It is a useful guess only because the bill is real on a page. A buyer can fall on a good asset. A buyer can fall on a bad price. The morning does not tell you which. Gold stock market news that needs the buyer's drop to mean "too expensive" has skipped the other half of the tape, which marked the seller up.
There is a third move that often does not happen, and it matters. The rest of the gold mining stocks do not have to re-rate because two neighbors signed a paper. A read-through is a story. The only prices that were forced to look at this deal were the two names on it. Precious metals investment opportunities is the phrase that shows up when a sector day feels like a door. A door for one seller is a cheque. It is not a door for every mine on the board.
Six kilometers is a distance. It is not a mill.
The asset SSR wants is the Converse gold project. SSR said it sits on the Battle Mountain-Eureka trend in Nevada, 6 kilometers west of the Marigold complex, and about 6 kilometers from Marigold's main infrastructure. The ground borders the Marigold property. The Northern Miner put the site about 275 kilometers northeast of Carson City. Close to a mill, in mining, is a gift when the rock, the road, the power, the permit, and the pad all agree. Close on a map is only the first of those.
SSR's sentence is careful, and the care is the point. It said Converse has the potential to add about 150,000 to 170,000 ounces of gold a year over an estimated mine life of 10 years or more. Initial production is targeted for 2033. It said that once Converse is in production, the U.S. platform, with Marigold and Cripple Creek & Victor in Colorado, is expected to exceed 450,000 ounces in peak years and to average about 350,000 to 400,000 ounces a year from 2033 to 2042. A later line in the same release called the 350,000 to 400,000 figure a potential. A footnote on the stacked picture said the existing U.S. profile is current proven and probable reserves only. Production it attributed to Converse is based on current mineral resources, indicated and inferred, and is conceptual. Potential is not a schedule. Expected is not a reserve. Conceptual is not a reserve.
The same release said developing Converse next to Marigold could deliver more than US$200 million in life-of-mine synergies versus a stand-alone build. A later line put the same claim at estimated undiscounted synergies of at least US$200 million, from cutting duplicate site and corporate overhead and from procurement and supply-chain savings. Extra items, including shared shops, a shared fleet, and shared water, were listed as further upside, not as the US$200 million already claimed. A synergy is a difference between two models. It is not cash in the quarter the deal closes. US$200 million over a life of mine, undiscounted, set next to a purchase price near US$464 million and a plant the buyer still has to build, is a claim about a later decade. You can write it down. You should not spend it. The cheaper pit shell is a different sentence. SSR said it would mine fewer tonnes per year than the April study because it would use a US$2,200 pit shell, the reserve price at Marigold. That is a smaller mine plan. It is not the overhead saving.
SSR also said it would build Converse as a contiguous piece of Marigold, using the same price shells as the Marigold report it filed the same day. Those shells are US$2,200 an ounce for reserves and US$2,500 an ounce for resources. That is a choice. It is not the choice in the study Roxmore already published.
The April study is a different mine
On April 20, 2026, Roxmore published a preliminary economic assessment for a stand-alone Converse. The after-tax net present value, at a 5 percent discount, was US$2.749 billion at a long-term gold price of US$3,600 an ounce. The after-tax internal rate of return was 42.8 percent. Payback was 2.2 years. At a spot price of US$4,700, which the company dated to April 16, the after-tax value was US$4.531 billion, the rate of return was 59.7 percent, and payback was 1.6 years. At US$2,500 an ounce, the after-tax value fell to US$845 million. The same table is the warning. The mine in the model is very large when the gold price in the model is very high. It is a different object at US$2,500.
The operating picture in that study is not SSR's picture. Roxmore described a heap leach and a single pit. Payable gold over the life was 3.5 million ounces. The average was about 267,000 ounces a year in the first eight full years, and about 246,000 ounces a year over a 14-year life. Cash operating cost was US$1,592 an ounce. All-in sustaining cost was US$1,769. Pre-production capital was US$829 million, made of US$530.7 million direct, US$132.5 million indirect, and US$165.8 million of contingency. Sustaining capital was US$513.6 million.
Put the two cases on one line, and do not average them. SSR's case is 150,000 to 170,000 ounces a year for 10 years or more, starting in 2033, inside Marigold's price shells. Roxmore's case is about 246,000 ounces a year for 14 years, in a stand-alone plant, at a study price of US$3,600. The annual rate in the buyer's case is lower than the seller's life-of-mine average. At about 170,000 ounces, the top of SSR's range, the cut is about a third. At about 150,000 ounces, the bottom of the range, the cut is closer to two-fifths. That is not a quarrel about rounding. It is two designs. A reader who adds 246,000 ounces to Marigold, because a PEA once said so, is adding a mine SSR has said it is not building.
The capital lines rhyme, and the rhyme can fool you. SSR put initial capital at US$800 million to US$900 million. The PEA put pre-production capital at US$829 million. The bands overlap. The overlap is not proof the plants are the same plant. One number can land in two designs by accident. SSR also said no material capital is expected until the early 2030s. From October 2026, the early 2030s can start in about three years. It is not a bill seven years away, and it is not a bill that hits the 2026 cash flow statement because a deal closed. Gold mining stocks that get valued on "they bought US$2.7 billion of value for US$464 million" are using the seller's model as if the buyer had adopted it. SSR's release said the opposite. It said its approach contrasts with the stand-alone case in the 2026 PEA.
Do the ratio anyway, and then refuse it. US$464 million is about 17 percent of the PEA's US$2.749 billion after-tax value at US$3,600. It is about 55 percent of the PEA's US$845 million value at US$2,500. Both ratios are true as division. Neither is a bargain you can take to a bank. The US$2.749 billion is not cash. It is a discounted model. It uses inferred resources, which a PEA is allowed to use and a reserve is not. It uses a gold price. It assumes a permit, a build, and a recovery. Change the price, and the model moves by more than the purchase price. That is the sensitivity table's job. It did the job. From US$2,500 to US$3,600, the after-tax value more than triples. A deal price cannot be "cheap" and "fair" against both rows at once.
The ounces are a category, not a pile
Roxmore's 2026 resource, which SSR cited, is the pile people will quote. Indicated resources were 103 million tonnes at 0.65 grams per tonne, containing 2.2 million ounces. Inferred resources were 218 million tonnes at 0.43 grams per tonne, containing 3.0 million ounces. SSR said the estimate has an effective date of March 31, 2026, and was built at a long-term gold price of US$3,000 an ounce. Roxmore's April release had the same tonnes and grades, with 2.16 million ounces indicated and 3.04 million inferred. The rounding is the same rock. The category is the point.
Indicated is not a reserve. Inferred is a step further back. More than half the contained ounces in that estimate sit in the inferred line. SSR's own footnote said the Converse ounces in its stacked U.S. picture include indicated and inferred, and are conceptual. Mineral resource development is the work of moving a category forward, or of deciding not to. Buying the company does not move the category. Drilling, engineering, a cost, and a gold price move it. A reserve is the category that can sit in a mine plan under the rules SSR used for Marigold the same morning. Converse was not in that category in the deal release.
The per-ounce shortcut is the trap. US$464 million divided by 2.2 million indicated ounces is about US$211 an indicated ounce. Divided by 5.2 million ounces, if you add the inferred as if they were the same thing, it is about US$89. Both divisions fit on a napkin. Both leave out the US$800 million to US$900 million still to be spent before the first SSR ounce, the sustaining capital, the tax, the recovery, and the ounces that never make the pit. A low dollar per contained ounce is how a resource looks before it is a mine. It is also how a resource looks when it should stay a resource. The napkin cannot tell those apart.
Grade is the other quiet fact. 0.65 grams per tonne indicated, and 0.43 inferred, is not a high-grade vein. It is a bulk target next to a mine that already runs bulk rock. That can be an advantage, because the neighbor already knows the district. It can be a limit, because the margin lives in the gold price, the strip, the recovery, and the cost per tonne, not in a spectacular assay. A deal story that leads with "multi-million ounces" and does not say the grams is selling the container. The grade is the contents.
The permit is a process. The year is 2033.
SSR was plain about the gate. Development needs federal permitting led by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management. That means a plan of operations and environmental baseline studies. Given the scale, SSR said an environmental impact statement is expected. It said it believes the path is well defined, and that it can use what it has learned permitting and running mines in Nevada, including Marigold and the adjacent Buffalo Valley project. Near-term work is baseline studies, permitting, flowsheet work, and technical de-risking. Belief is not a record of decision.
A permit of that size is measured in years, not in news cycles. SSR's own clock already says so. No material capital until the early 2030s. First production targeted for 2033. From October 2026, that is more than six years to an ounce that is still described as potential. Six years is time for a gold price to change, for a study to be redone, for a condition in the record of decision to move a pad, and for a balance sheet that funded a cheque in 2026 to be a different balance sheet. The cheque, if it closes, is spent up front. The ounce arrives, if it arrives, at the end of the queue.
Buffalo Valley is the contrast, and it is not this deal. In the Marigold report issued the same day, first gold from Buffalo Valley is expected in 2029. That project is already inside SSR's plan for a mine it owns. Converse is a project it has agreed to buy, still on the other side of a shareholder vote. Putting them in one sentence because both are near Marigold is how a timeline gets laundered. 2029 is not 2033. Owned is not agreed.
The same morning, the reserve was somewhere else
SSR did not announce only a purchase. It announced a 20-year life-of-mine plan for Marigold, based on a mineral reserve of 4.6 million ounces. That is a 43 percent increase from 3.2 million ounces at the end of 2025. The release put life-of-mine gold production at 3.3 million ounces, at an average all-in sustaining cost of US$2,062 an ounce sold. Footnote 2 said that from 2027 onward the same mine is 3.2 million ounces at US$2,005, because 2026 is only a partial year in the study. A table listed 3,208 thousand ounces from 2027 through 2050, and a life-of-mine cost of US$2,005 in that column. Those are different windows, not a sloppy rounding of one count into 3.3. The five-year cost in the table, for 2027 to 2031, was US$2,279. The cost for 2027 to 2040, which the company called active mining, was US$2,183. There is no single sustaining cost in the release. Name the window or do not use the number. After-tax net present value at 5 percent was US$3.3 billion at consensus gold prices averaging US$3,948 over the 20 years, and US$3.8 billion at the spot case the company used. Reserve shells were US$2,200 an ounce. Resource shells were US$2,500.
The life is 20 years in the way the company defined it. Active mining is shorter. The plan includes years of heap-leach rinsing and drawdown after the shovels slow. Average production was put at 231,000 ounces a year from 2027 to 2031, 201,000 ounces through 2040, and 169,000 ounces over the full life. Over the active mining years, the release put average after-tax operating cash flow at US$354 million a year and after-tax free cash flow at US$273 million, at those consensus prices. Measured and indicated resources, on top of reserves, were 1.7 million ounces. Inferred resources were 0.3 million ounces. The U.S. portfolio, Marigold plus Cripple Creek & Victor, was described with 7.3 million ounces of combined gold reserves, plus 6.5 million ounces of measured and indicated resources and 2.3 million ounces inferred.
Hold that next to Converse, and keep the labels. Marigold's 4.6 million ounces are reserves, inside a mine that already operates, at sustaining costs the company printed for named windows, at a value that moves with a stated gold price. Converse's 2.2 million and 3.0 million ounces are resources, indicated and inferred, inside a study the buyer has said it is not adopting as the plan. Adding 5.2 million resource ounces to 4.6 million reserve ounces, and calling the sum a bigger reserve, is a category error. SSR's footnote refused that addition. A reader should refuse it too. The deal did not increase the reserve. The Marigold report did. They were released on the same morning so they would be read as one story. The accounting does not have to obey the headline.
One more company fact belongs in the background, and only there. SSR's own news list shows it completed the sale of the Copler mine on June 24, 2026, and completed the sale of its 20 percent interest in Hod Maden on July 17, 2026. The October deal is a purchase next to a mine it is keeping, after sales of assets elsewhere. That is context for the balance sheet it says will fund the cheque. It is not a reason the Converse ounces are safer. Selling one mine and buying a neighbor are two decisions. Each can be right or wrong on its own terms.
What has to happen before the cash moves
The conditions are the part a premium tends to skip. Roxmore securityholders have to approve the plan. SSR said that means at least two-thirds of the votes cast by holders of shares, warrants, and options. If required, there is a second test, a simple majority of the votes cast by shareholders excluding certain interested holders under the Canadian rule that protects minority holders in special deals. A court has to approve the arrangement. Other closing conditions, of the kind these deals usually carry, have to be satisfied or waived. The target quarter is the fourth quarter of 2026. A target is a calendar. It is not a closing press release.
Support is not the same as approval. Directors, senior executives, and some large holders agreed to vote in favor. Together they hold about 26.8 percent of Roxmore on a fully diluted basis. Two-thirds is the bar on the main vote. The promised block is well short of that bar. It is a head start. It is not a result. A head start of that size matters, because the people who know the asset best have agreed to take the cash and the stub. It does not bind the rest of the register.
The break fee is the price of walking away, and it is small next to the cheque. SSR said Roxmore would owe it C$18 million in certain cases if the deal does not close. Roxmore's cash headline was about C$663 million. Eighteen million is under 3 percent of that cheque. A fee that small can deter a casual rival. It does not make a close certain. It does not pay SSR back for a year of work if a vote fails. Gold mining mergers and acquisitions often advertise the fee as if it were a lock. A lock is a vote count after the meeting. This meeting has not been held.
What you can underwrite
You can underwrite the offer that was written down. C$6.75 in cash per Roxmore share. A stub of 0.33 of a SpinCo share, which the seller estimated at about C$0.50 and which does not trade. Cash equity value of about US$464 million, excluding the stub. Enterprise value of about US$392 million, a gap of about US$72 million that the release states and does not, in the lines used here, explain line by line. Premiums of about 27 percent to the October 9 close and about 47 percent to the 20-day average, on the cash alone. With the seller's stub estimate included, Roxmore put the premiums at about 36 percent and about 58 percent. Funding from SSR's existing cash, as SSR described it. A break fee of C$18 million in stated cases. A vote, a possible second vote, and a court. A target close in the fourth quarter of 2026. Support agreements covering about 26.8 percent.
You can underwrite the geography without underwriting the synergy. Converse borders Marigold. SSR said the project is about 6 kilometers from the main infrastructure. The buyer put the saving at more than US$200 million over a mine life, and at least US$200 million on an undiscounted basis, from overhead and procurement rather than from a shared pit. The thought is a model. The kilometers are a measurement. Keep the measurement. Hold the model until a later study uses SSR's shells, SSR's plant, and a cost you can read.
You can underwrite the resource as a resource. About 2.2 million ounces indicated and about 3.0 million ounces inferred, effective March 31, 2026, at a US$3,000 resource price in SSR's citation. You can underwrite that SSR's production case is 150,000 to 170,000 ounces a year, conceptual, including inferred ounces, aimed at 2033, after capital of US$800 million to US$900 million that it does not expect to spend in a material way until the early 2030s. You can underwrite that this case is not the April PEA. The PEA is a stand-alone heap leach, about 246,000 ounces a year over 14 years, US$829 million to build, US$1,769 sustaining cost, and an after-tax value of US$2.749 billion at US$3,600 that falls to US$845 million at US$2,500.
You can underwrite Marigold as the reserve next door, not as a result of this purchase. 4.6 million ounces of gold reserves, up 43 percent from 3.2 million. A life the company calls 20 years, with rinsing inside that life. A headline sustaining cost of US$2,062 an ounce, a 2027-forward footnote cost of US$2,005, a five-year table cost of US$2,279, and a 2027-to-2040 table cost of US$2,183. A value of US$3.3 billion after tax at consensus prices averaging US$3,948, and US$3.8 billion in the company's spot case. Buffalo Valley first gold aimed at 2029, inside that plan. None of those sentences require Roxmore to exist.
What the deal does not mean
It does not mean SSR got a mine for US$464 million. It agreed to buy shares. The shares own a project. The project owns a resource. The resource is not a reserve. The reserve is what Marigold already had, and what the other release increased. A purchase of shares transfers the resource. It does not promote it.
It does not mean production rises by 150,000 ounces next year, or by 246,000. The buyer's case starts, if it starts, in 2033. The seller's case was a different plant. Until a new technical report replaces both, the honest production number for Converse inside SSR is zero. Zero is not an insult. It is the difference between a neighbor and a mill.
It does not mean the stub is worth C$0.50. That figure is Roxmore's estimate of paper in a company that is not listed in the release as a trading stock. The morning tape, if the Northern Miner's $6.96 was Canadian dollars, was willing to pay about 21 cents over the cash for the whole package. Estimates and tapes argue. They do not become each other. Holders who wanted only cash were not offered only cash. They were offered cash and a third of a new explorer, with US$10 million in the box and three projects that are not Converse. That is a second bet, whether the holder asked for it or not.
It does not mean SSR's share price drop is the cost of a mistake, or that Roxmore's jump is the proof of a bargain. How mining acquisitions affect stock prices, on a normal morning, is a split. The seller moves toward the bid. The buyer gives up the cash and takes the questions. Gold stock market news that picks one move and ignores the other is writing a moral. The moral is not in the geology. The geology is 0.65 grams and 0.43 grams, six kilometers from a mine, behind a permit.
What would make this reading wrong
The reading is wrong if SSR's case and the PEA turn out to be the same mine in different clothes. A later study could show 246,000 ounces, a stand-alone plant, and the US$3,600 value, and SSR could adopt it. Then the contrast in the October 13 release was a negotiating posture, or a shell-price choice that did not survive contact with the rock. You would still have been right to refuse the blend on the day it was announced. You would update when the new study arrives. You would not have been right to spend the US$2.749 billion on October 13.
The reading is wrong if the permit is shorter than the company's own clock. Baseline studies, a plan of operations, and an environmental impact statement can move faster than the phrase "early 2030s" suggests, especially beside a mine the same company already runs. Buffalo Valley's path is the evidence that SSR knows this district. Knowledge can shorten a queue. It cannot repeal the federal steps the release itself listed. If a record of decision lands years early, the 2033 target was conservative. The ounce would still have to be built. Capital of US$800 million to US$900 million does not get smaller because the paperwork finished early. It gets spent sooner.
The reading is wrong if the categories move. Infill drilling could turn a large part of the inferred ounces into indicated, and a reserve could be declared at the US$2,200 shell SSR prefers. Then the napkin price per ounce would sit on a stronger noun. It would still not be a margin. A reserve at a low grade still has to clear the sustaining cost, the strip, and the gold price. Marigold's new plan prints four sustaining costs, depending on the window: US$2,062 in the headline, US$2,005 from 2027 in the footnote, US$2,279 over the first five years, and US$2,183 from 2027 to 2040. The PEA's sustaining cost was US$1,769, in a different design. A reserve at Converse would be good news about certainty. It would not, by itself, be news about a bargain.
The reading is also wrong if the deal does not close. A vote can fail. A court can ask for a change. A condition can bite. The break fee is C$18 million, not the US$464 million. If the deal dies, Roxmore goes back to being the owner of a PEA, and SSR goes back to being the owner of Marigold, with a morning of headlines and a small fee or none. The resource does not vanish. The reserve does not grow. The only thing that would have been real, and then not, is the cheque. That is why the cheque and the ounce should never have shared a sentence without a date on each.
The idea, once
On October 13, 2026, SSR Mining agreed to pay C$6.75 a share in cash for Roxmore, about US$464 million before a paper stub, for a project six kilometers from Marigold. The stub is a new explorer, estimated by the seller at about C$0.50 a share, holding the assets that are not Converse, with US$10 million in cash. The seller's April study showed a stand-alone mine worth US$2.749 billion after tax at US$3,600 gold, and US$845 million at US$2,500, producing about 246,000 ounces a year. The buyer's case is a different mine: 150,000 to 170,000 ounces a year, conceptual, including inferred resources, first gold targeted for 2033, capital of US$800 million to US$900 million deferred into the early 2030s, after a federal permit that is still ahead. The same morning, Marigold's reserve was 4.6 million ounces, up 43 percent, in a mine that already runs. The deal did not add those ounces. A deal is a price for a share. The price can close this quarter. The ounce, on the page SSR actually wrote, is a 2033 idea. Read the date before you read the ounces.
A note on sources and limits
The cash price of C$6.75, the premiums of about 27 percent and 47 percent, the equity value of about US$464 million, the enterprise value of about US$392 million, the SpinCo ownership split of 85.01 percent and 14.99 percent, the US$10 million funding, the 6-kilometer distance, the 150,000 to 170,000 ounce case, the 2033 target, the US$800 million to US$900 million capital range, the US$2,200 and US$2,500 shells, the contrast with the stand-alone PEA, the resource of 2.2 million ounces indicated and 3.0 million inferred, the US$3,000 resource price, the March 31, 2026 effective date, the permitting steps, the two-thirds vote, the 26.8 percent support, the C$18 million break fee, the fourth-quarter 2026 target, and the balance-sheet funding are from SSR Mining's October 13, 2026 news release. The 0.33 SpinCo fraction, the C$0.50 estimate, the C$663 million, C$49 million, and C$712 million figures, and the 36 percent and 58 percent premiums that include the stub, are from Roxmore's October 13, 2026 release. The PEA figures, including the US$2.749 billion value at US$3,600, the US$845 million value at US$2,500, the US$4.531 billion value at US$4,700, the 42.8 percent after-tax return, the 246,000 ounce average, the US$829 million pre-production capital, and the US$1,769 sustaining cost, are from Roxmore's April 20, 2026 release. Marigold's 4.6 million ounce reserve, the 43 percent increase, the headline sustaining cost of US$2,062, the footnote cost of US$2,005 from 2027, the table costs of US$2,279 and US$2,183, the US$3.3 billion and US$3.8 billion values, the US$3,948 consensus price, and the production figures including the 3,208 thousand ounce table are from SSR's October 13, 2026 Marigold release. The headline's 3.3 million ounces and the table's 3,208 thousand ounces are different windows. Footnote 2 says that from 2027 the figure is 3.2 million ounces, because 2026 is a partial year in the study. The synergy lines of more than US$200 million and at least US$200 million, undiscounted, from overhead and procurement, and the peak-year line above 450,000 ounces, are from SSR's October 13, 2026 acquisition release. The morning share prices are from The Northern Miner's account that day, not from a closing print used here. Dollar illustrations are division of those published figures. They are not forecasts of profit, of a close, or of a gold price. Nothing here is investment advice, a solicitation, or a personal recommendation. The deal may not close. Studies change. You can lose money. Do your own work.